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Abstract. We investigate how a player’s strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions she
uses in thinking about the game, i.e., the “frame”. To do so, we consider matching games where
two players are presented with a set of objects, from which each player must privately choose
one (with the goal of matching the counterpart’s choice). We propose a novel theory positing that
different player types are aware of different attributes of the strategy options, hence different
frames; we then rationalize why differences in players’ frames may lead to differences in choice
behavior. Unlike previous theories of framing, our model features an epistemic structure
allowing for the case in which an individual learns new frames, given some initial unawareness
(of the fact that her perception of attributes may be incomplete). To test our model, we introduce
an experimental design in which we bring about different frames by manipulating subjects’
awareness of various attributes. The experimental results provide strong support for our theory.
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I. Introduction
Cognitive scientists define a “frame” as a bundle of information about the typical
characteristics of a situation or problem: frames are stored in individuals’ minds and provide them
with default information with which to interpret and respond to events (Schank and Abelson, 1977).
Relatedly, artificial-intelligence pioneer Marvin Minsky (1975) utilized frames to codify knowledge
structures in the context of visual-reasoning and communication-processing problems; for instance,
the appropriate interpretation of (and response to) a hand sign or gesture depends on the agents’
mutual understanding of the situation in which the sign occurs. In these and other types of everyday
problems, we face an implicit coordination puzzle whose solution depends on the frames we use.
For example, how do you decide how to greet someone? (Do you shake hands? Hug? Cheek kiss? If
so, how many times?) Such problems might seem trivial to many of us because we often interact
with people from our own culture, or with a similar background and experience: in other words, we
often interact with people with whom we share a frame. We therefore solve many of these problems
effortlessly, to the point that we do not notice that there was a coordination problem in the first
place. Yet, even within a tightly-knit community, miscoordination (such as a social faux pas) may
arise whenever we interact with individuals who view a given problem through a different lens.1
The cognitive process underlying everyday coordination problems may be described as
follows: one categorizes (i.e., mentally frames) the problem on the basis of some recognizable
characteristics, and then one follows the solution that is naturally associated with that category of
problems. Thus, one’s perception (i.e., awareness) of the problem’s characteristics is key to one’s
behavior. Accordingly, in this paper we aim to investigate – both theoretically and experimentally –
how one’s perception may affect one’s behavior in abstract coordination games. We note that the
issue of equilibrium selection is a long-standing consideration in the game-theoretic study of
coordination problems (i.e., the class of symmetric, simultaneous-move games with multiple purestrategy Nash equilibria). In this regard, Thomas Schelling (1960) was the first to draw attention to
the importance of contextual cues in coordination problems. In particular, Schelling informally
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The theory of the firm considers coordination problems one of two main organizational hurdles (the other being the
much more studied “agency problem”: Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Camerer and Knez, 1997). It has been suggested
that the coordination problem of organizations is inherently due to people’s cognitive limitations, in the sense that
individuals often lack a common understanding of the tasks they need to integrate and coordinate upon (Heath and
Staudenmayer, 2000). This line of research implies that agents come to develop a different understanding of their tasks
as a result of a different focus or experience; different viewpoints may in turn imply different solutions to an identical or
similar task (von Hippel, 1990; Weber and Camerer, 2003; Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009).
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observed that the use of mutually-recognizable cues (i.e., characteristics or “attributes” of the
problem) could help individuals solve a coordination game. Here we delve into the cognitive
process underlying an individual’s strategic use of natural frames. To that end, we shall investigate
the following perception-action chain: awareness of attributes 𝐾 ⟶ 𝐾-induced frame ⟶ behavior.
An example is provided below.
Consider a “matching game” where two players are presented with a set of objects from
which each player must privately choose one (with the goal of matching her counterpart’s choice).
In this case a frame may be thought of as a player’s categorization of objects (i.e., actions) on the
basis of the attributes of which she is aware. For example suppose that, for any player 𝑖, the action
set in a matching game is formally given by {𝑠𝑖,1 , 𝑠𝑖,2 , 𝑠𝑖,3 }, with options 1, 2, and 3 respectively
representing a cyan triangle, a cyan diamond, and a lavender triangle. Note that the theorist’s
conventional way of defining a game does not permit any characterization of the objects to enter the
formal description of the game. On the other hand, as was first suggested by philosopher David
Gauthier (1975), here a color-perceiving player 𝑖 would naturally distinguish between the colors
(cyan and lavender). In fact, the act of distinguishing between colors formally implies that she
would be able to partition the action set so that each cell corresponds to an instance of the color
attribute, that is, {{𝑠𝑖,1 , 𝑠𝑖,2 }, {𝑠𝑖,3 }}. By contrast, a shape-perceiving player 𝑖 would partition the
action set so that each cell corresponds to an instance of the shape attribute, that is, {{𝑠𝑖,1 , 𝑠𝑖,3 }, {𝑠𝑖,2 }}.
If a player distinguishes between shapes but not colors, we say that that player is unaware of the
color attribute (and so has “partial perception” of the qualitative characteristics of her action set).
Generalizing, one could think of player types, where a type is endowed with the ability to
distinguish among instances of some (or all) of the relevant attributes characterizing the action set.
Below we propose a novel theory positing that different player types are aware of different
attributes of the strategy options, and hence use different frames. Given this, our model provides a
rationalization of why differences in players’ frames may lead to differences in choice behavior (in
particular, cells that contain fewer elements are more attractive). Thus, in the example above our
model predicts that a “color type” would likely pick the odd-one-out with respect to the color
attribute (i.e., the color oddity), whereas a “shape type” would likely pick the odd-one-out with
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respect to the shape attribute (i.e., the shape oddity).2 As will be clear, our theory builds on two
alternative approaches to the analysis of framings: (i) the models of Bacharach (1993), Casajus
(2000), and Janssen (2001), in which strategy labels represent non-stochastic instances of attributes,
as in the example above; and (ii) the Sugden (1995) model, in which labeled strategies are generated
stochastically.3 All such theories explain the impact of frames on choice behavior by analyzing the
structure of the strategy set, as experienced by a player. (A similar approach was followed by
Crawford and Haller, 1990, and Blume, 2000, for the case of repeated coordination games, whereby
previous play would implicitly label actions in such a way to generate a distinct option; e.g., “do
what you did last time”, “do something else”.)
In what follows we focus on one-shot games and, unlike previous contributions, we
incorporate an epistemic structure into the analysis of frames. In doing so, for the first time we
formalize the relationship between a player’s partial perception (of the qualitative characteristics of
the action set) and frame-dependent rationalizable actions. This exercise has both theoretical and
practical implications. Whereas previous models could identify the impact of fixed frames on
choice behavior, they would not account for changes in a player’s frames. That is, by providing
static representations of individuals’ perceptual limitations, previous models could not explain the
eventuality that a player might react to novel frames that initially eluded her (e.g., think of a player
who suddenly focuses on some qualitative feature of an action that makes it uniquely distinctive). In
fact, previous solutions such as Bacharach’s (1993) “variable universe equilibrium” and related
specifications cannot convincingly be taken as equilibria proper, in the sense of being stable
solutions. (The instability amounts to any behavioral changes disrupting an equilibrium outcome
owing to the discovery of new frames; e.g., via an experimental manipulation.) To provide a more
coherent solution concept that inherently allows for the discovery of new frames, we propose
“frame-dependent rationalizability”.4 Such a solution rests on an epistemic structure allowing for
the case in which an individual learns new frames, given some initial unawareness of one or more
The idea of partitioning the strategy space in order to model a player’s conception of the game was suggested by
Gauthier (1975) and later used in Bacharach’s (1993) work on “variable universe games”. Following Bacharach, we
refer to an item that differs from others (in some particular feature) as an “oddity”.
3
Sugden (1995) assumes that players distinguish between alternative strategies on the basis of a private description,
which rests on independent realizations of a commonly-known random process. Here, we are going to focus on private
descriptions that depend on publicly-observed realizations of a random process. For example, think of a matching game
where objects are randomly drawn from an urn – in front of all players – and then privately labeled by players as “the
first object”, “the second object”, “the third object”, etc.
4
We derive this concept from the interim correlated rationalizability notion of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007),
although we introduce frame-dependent restrictions on beliefs so as to account for (type-specific) partial perception.
2
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attributes.5 Our solution implies that – given the attributes of which one is currently aware – one
will best-respond solely to the types of which one can conceive; when one’s awareness expands, the
process is coherently updated so as to account for newly-discovered frames (i.e., types).
To test whether subjects maximize a (possibly updated) frame-dependent expected utility,
our between-subjects experimental design brings about different frames by manipulating subjects’
awareness of several attributes. We designed two main treatments, along with three supplemental
ones (discussed later); all treatments involve matching games. In the “Baseline” treatment, we first
allowed subjects to label the strategy space (i.e., the objects) as desired; we next asked subjects to
estimate how others would play, and we finally had them pick one of their labeled strategies. The
“All-Aware” treatment is the same as the Baseline except that, before having subjects estimate how
others would play, we hinted at several attributes at once (so that each subject was privately made
aware of multiple attributes, without inducing common awareness of any particular frame).6
Unlike previous coordination experiments (e.g., Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden, 1994;
Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997; Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich, 2008; Bardsley, Mehta,
Starmer, and Sugden, 2010; Blume and Gneezy, 2010), our design is instrumental in testing for our
notion of frame-dependent rationalizability. In fact, contrasting the Baseline and the All-Aware
treatments allows us to verify whether partial perception (i.e., awareness) of attributes, hence
frames, affects choice behavior. In brief, we consider that All-Aware participants – prior to the
treatment manipulation – are similar to their Baseline counterparts (on average), but eventually
become aware of additional frames as a result of the All-Aware treatment manipulation. The
implication is that an increase in frame awareness may affect the distribution of choices in the AllAware treatment, as compared with the Baseline. Relatedly, we note that our proposed solution
concept allows for the set of possible events (frames) to expand, and therefore for a decision-maker
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Notably, unawareness cannot be accounted for under the assumptions of the standard model of knowledge (Modica
and Rustichini, 1994, 1999; Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, 1998). So, our framework’s epistemic structure does not
feature the “negative introspection” property, according to which ¬[know E] entails know[¬[know E]], where E denotes
a generic event (Dekel and Gul, 1997). As will be discussed, our model of knowledge draws on Heifetz, Meier, and
Schipper’s (2006) specification of unawareness by adopting a system of multiple state spaces and surjective projections
(onto weakly “less expressive” state spaces).
6
We do so by asking subjects the following questions: “How likely do you think it is that the other participants have
noticed the order in which the objects have been drawn by the experimenter? […] the different colors of the objects?
[…] the different shapes of the objects?” We note that these questions can be identified with tautologies stating that “𝑥
is the case or ¬𝑥 is the case”. In fact, a question involving a tautological clause does not convey any specific
information about the state of 𝑥, and yet it may raise awareness.
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to react to novel information (in the form of a newly-discovered frame) by maximizing an updated
frame-dependent expected utility.
More explicitly, we stress that the All-Aware treatment is identical to the Baseline except
that, in the former, our experimental manipulation makes subjects privately aware of multiple
attributes. It follows that the behavior of a subject who (prior to the All-Aware manipulation) had
been unaware of some of those attributes might be affected by the fact that we mention them in the
All-Aware treatment.7 Indeed, any differences in choice behavior between All-Aware and Baseline
can be attributed to the fact that, in the former, one comes to consider additional frames; i.e., a fact
that may impact one’s rationalizable actions.8
Our empirical analysis indicates that subjects do best-respond to their (updated) beliefs
about the opponents’ frames. Specifically, our data show that the distribution of choices varies
significantly across Baseline and All-Aware treatments. In particular, we find that participants in
the Baseline treatment tend to behave predominantly like “color types”, and to a lesser extent like
“shape types” (by picking the oddity with respect to color labels and shape labels, respectively).
More importantly, we observe that All-Aware participants choose color oddities significantly less
often than Baseline participants: our interpretation is that whenever subjects are made aware of
attributes (such as the shape or the order in which the blocks are displayed) that they had previously
ignored, they end up realizing that their reasons for picking a color oddity may not be so compelling
after all.
Notably, the effect of the All-Aware manipulation is to deterministically change the calculus
of coordination, as is confirmed by the analysis conducted on the All-Aware sample. There, using
the All-Aware participants’ beliefs (about others noticing each attribute) as predictors, we are able
to verify the implications of frame-dependent rationalizability more directly. For example, if an
All-Aware participant believes that (Baseline) subjects are more likely to notice, say, shapes than
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More generally, the behavior of an agent who had been unaware of an event might be affected by a sentence that
merely hints that that event may or may not happen. (Note that if players’ frames are incomplete, then the space of
events on which a player’s beliefs are defined is incomplete as well.) For example imagine that, as you prepare to go out
for a stroll, your partner asks you whether it might rain. If you had already assigned probability zero to the event “rain”,
then you will be unmoved by such a question. If, instead, you had ignored that event – and you now notice it is cloudy
outside – then you may react by taking an umbrella along.
8
Note that our design controls both for a subject’s awareness level – which is exogenously varied – and for a subject’s
probabilistic beliefs about others noticing each attribute (such beliefs are elicited in the All-Aware treatment): this
allows us to directly test for frame-dependent rationalizability. As a side note, we stress that our design minimizes
demand effects by mentioning multiple cues at once.
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colors or order, then that participant should be more likely to pick a shape oddity (if there is one).
We shall see that the regression analysis provides support for our notion of rationalizability.
To corroborate our framework, we contrasted the Baseline against three supplemental
treatments, namely “Color-Aware”, “Shape-Aware”, and “Order-Aware”. Each of these
treatments is the same as the Baseline except that the objects are now exogenously labeled in terms
of colors, shapes, or the order in which the blocks are displayed, respectively. The purpose of these
treatments is to bring about three pools of subjects, where each pool is characterized by common
awareness of one frame. There, the experimenter should expect an increase (or, at worst, no
decrease relative to the Baseline) in the frequency of the strategy associated with the relevant frame.
Data from the supplemental treatments show that Color-Aware subjects pick the color
oddity slightly more frequently than our Baseline participants; moreover, Color-Aware subjects
pick the shape oddity significantly less often than our Baseline participants. Similarly, the data
show that Shape-Aware subjects pick the shape oddity significantly more often than our Baseline
participants. Our interpretation is that subjects, who would have otherwise ignored the shape
(color) attribute, end up noticing shape (color) oddities once they are assigned to Shape-Aware
(Color-Aware). When contrasting the Baseline with the Order-Aware treatment, our data show no
significant difference in the choices of either color or shape oddities, as predicted by the model;
instead, we observe that subjects tend to pick the first block significantly more often than the third
one. (This appears to be consistent with Schelling’s, 1960, p. 94 argument that people have a
tendency to single out the first item in a numerical sequence.) As a final note, our data provide
evidence of an increase in coordination rates when moving from the main treatments to the
supplemental treatments (i.e., treatments inducing common awareness of one attribute).
In summary, we propose and test a model positing heterogeneity in individuals’ partial
awareness of attributes (of the strategy options),9 hence heterogeneity in frames. We then rationalize
why differences in players’ frames may lead to differences in choice behavior. Our experimental
results provide strong support for our model, presenting a coherent account of the effect of
manipulating awareness (of alternative framings) on strategic behavior. The remainder of the
article is organized in this manner: section II presents the game, along with the experimental design
and procedures; section III lays out the model, and IV discusses its predictions; section V presents
In doing so, we substantially depart from the recent decision-theoretic literature on focusing (e.g., Kőszegi and Szeidl,
2012; Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2013; etc.), which posits that agents overweight some attributes of the strategy
options under the assumption that they are always aware of all attributes.
9
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the experimental results, and VI offers concluding remarks in relation to our contribution to the
literature.

II. Game, experimental design, and procedures
Our experimental design involves a coordination game we call “Choose Something”. In this
game each subject is assigned to a computer terminal, and each is told that everyone is shown the
same six objects on her own screen. The objects are blocks (i.e., colored shapes), which the
computer program identifies by the numbers – invisible to the subjects – 1 to 6, as in Table 1 below
(the experiment was conducted using the zTree software; Fischbacher, 2007).
Object no.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Color

Cyan

Cyan

Lavender

Lavender

Turquoise

Turquoise

Shape

Triangle

Diamond

Triangle

Pentagon

Diamond

Pentagon

Table 1 - Characteristics of the objects in Choose Something.

Initially, the blocks are loosely arranged in a hexagonal fashion (one object per vertex) and
collectively occupy the left-hand side of the screen. Each subject is assigned to an unknown
partner. After each has viewed the six objects on her own screen, the computer program selects
three of those objects – one by one – by sliding them and putting them in a column on the righthand-side of the screen (note: the same three objects for each member of a pair). The rest of the
objects subsequently disappear from the screen. Participants are then prompted to complete a few
tasks. In particular, each subject is asked to indicate her choice of one of the three objects, with the
goal of coordinating with her partner in the pair. Each member of a pair receives a payoff of $1.25
if each chooses the same object; each receives nothing otherwise. A copy of the experimental
instructions and screen shots are in the Appendix.10 In what follows we extensively describe each
of the experimental treatments in turn.
The list below specifies the entire sequence of events in the “Baseline” treatment.
i.

Each subject is assigned to a computer terminal and everyone is shown the paper
instructions.

A summary of the instructions, including the following message, was read aloud by the experimenter: “The computer
program will select three of the aforementioned objects, and will display those three objects to every participant in the
same fashion and order.”
10

7

ii.
iii.
iv.

v.

vi.

vii.

Pairs of subjects are formed at random. Subjects are presented with six objects on their
screen, three of which are subsequently selected by the program and put in a column.
An on-screen message prompts subjects to label those three objects [“PART A”].
An on-screen message prompts subjects to estimate the probabilities of the three objects
being chosen by others [“PART B”]; they are informed that good guesses will be
rewarded with an additional payment.11
An on-screen message prompts subjects to choose an object (by ticking the box located
next to the label); they are reminded that their payoff will be $1.25 if both members of
the pair chose the same object, $0 otherwise [“PART C”].
Steps ii.-v. are repeated for 9 more rounds, whereby in each round a new three-object
selection is implemented by the program and shown to each member of a pair.12 (In each
round, subjects are randomly assigned to another pair and are so informed.) No feedback
is given between rounds.
Payment.

We stress that the design of our Baseline treatment involves no exogenous labels associated with the
strategy options (i.e., the blocks). In fact, in order to identify the blocks – for the purposes of
performing tasks iv. and v. – in PART A of each round subjects are asked to type a short text in each
of three boxes beside the objects. (Note that our hypothesis-testing does not rely on such qualitative
data; the labeling task simply serves the purpose of pushing subjects to think of the game in their
own terms.) After that, in PART B of each round, subjects are asked to estimate the likelihood of
each block being chosen by others. Finally, in PART C of each round, subjects are asked to choose
a block. The entire set-up is common information amongst all participants.
The design of the “All-Aware” treatment is the same as the Baseline except for PART B,
which presents 3 extra questions. Specifically, in PART B subjects see the following message.
«Recall that – in Part C of the experiment – you will be prompted to pick one object in order
to coordinate with your partner. Now, prior to that we would like to know what you think
about the other participants in this room. Please answer the following questions by moving
the sliders to the desired percentages. Note that your partner will not be asked to answer
these questions.
11

Subjects are presented with a pie chart with three spokes. The spokes are initially arranged in such a way that each
sector corresponds to one-third of the area. Subjects are prompted to move the spokes to the desired percentages (note
that within each sector there is a text box containing the label the subject has entered at step iii.). We incentivized this
task by informing participants that if at least one of their three estimates differed by no more than 5 percentage points
from the realized value, they would receive an additional payment of $0.25 at the end of the experimental session. No
feedback was provided before the end of the session.
12
At the beginning of every round, subjects are shown the same six blocks as in round 1, but three different blocks are
subsequently selected in each round. Note that the initial position of the six blocks is re-shuffled in every successive
round, but is identical for all subjects taking part in the same round.
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1) How likely do you think it is that the other participants have noticed the order in which
the objects have been drawn by the computer program? Please move the below slider.
2) How likely do you think it is that the other participants have noticed the different colors
of the objects? Please move the below slider.
3) How likely do you think it is that the other participants have noticed the different shapes
of the objects? Please move the below slider.»
A few comments are due. The order in which questions 1) - 3) are presented was randomized in
each round. Subjects entered their guesses by moving a slider (i.e., one slider per question) to the
desired percentage, with the slider ranging from 0% to 100%. Note that the questions above were
not incentivized; the purpose of these questions is to make each subject privately aware of multiple
attributes. Also note that, after presenting questions 1) - 3) above, the All-Aware treatment proceeds
to the incentivized belief-elicitation task described at step iv. of the Baseline; the rest of the
treatment is identical to the Baseline.
Finally, we designed three supplemental treatments to be the same as the Baseline, except
for the labeling task of step iii. above (i.e., PART A): in such treatments the labeling task is omitted
as the blocks are already labeled. Specifically, in PART A of the “Color-Aware”, “Shape-Aware”,
and “Order-Aware” treatments, each of the available objects is displayed beside a color, shape, or
order label, respectively. The purpose of such labels is to bring about common awareness of the
relevant frame.13

III. The model
1. Frames and perceptual limitations
The model applies to any 2-player coordination game where each player’s payoff is a
positive number 𝜋 if both choose the same action, zero otherwise (“matching games”). We now
distinguish between the theorist’s and the players’ way of identifying actions. To that end, we let an
index denote the theorist’s (frame-free) identifier of a player’s action, as follows: a game has a set
{𝑠𝑖,1 , 𝑠𝑖,2 , … , 𝑠𝑖,𝑚 } of pure actions, with generic element 𝑠𝑖,𝑏 , where the first and second index

subscripts respectively indicate some player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 = {1,2} and some option 𝑏 ∈ {1, … , 𝑚}. For
example, in Choose Something, the theorist might denote by 𝑠𝑖,𝑏 “player 𝑖’s act of picking block 𝑏”,
where 𝑏 is a number between 1 and 6, as in Table 1 above. In this regard, we note that in Choose
Something only three of the actions above become available once Nature has drawn the
13

In the Color-Aware and Shape-Aware treatments we used the labels in Table 1 above. In the Order-Aware treatment
we used the labels “𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡”, “𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 ”, “𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑”.
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corresponding blocks; so, for the theorist Choose Something consists of (6) = 3!3! = 20 symmetric
6!

3

games in strategic form, where Nature determines the one game to be played by the pair.14 We
stress that, per the theorist’s way of identifying actions, each of those 3-action games is isomorphic
to the others, in that each differs from the others solely in the indices; e.g., {𝑠𝑖,1 , 𝑠𝑖,2 , 𝑠𝑖,3 },
{𝑠𝑖,1 , 𝑠𝑖,2 , 𝑠𝑖,4 }, {𝑠𝑖,1 , 𝑠𝑖,2 , 𝑠𝑖,5 }, …

By contrast, the players’ way of identifying actions is based on a perceptual description, as
follows. Let 𝐾 denote a set of attributes, with generic element 𝑘. With specific reference to Choose
Something, we shall assume 𝐾 = {C, S, O}, with C, S, O respectively denoting the “color”, “shape”,
and “order” attributes. Each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is associated with a set of instances of that attribute, which are
referred to as “𝑘-instances”; e.g., in the case of the color attribute, C-instances include “cyan”,
“turquoise”, etc. (see Table 1 above for color and shape instances in Choose Something).
The rest of the sub-section proceeds as follows: a) First, for any action set, we define
alternative variously-expressive (i.e., detailed) descriptions of that action set. b) We then define
projections from any description of an action set to a less expressive description of that action set.
c) Next, we explicitly relate the variously-expressive descriptions above to different players: in
doing so, we assume that players may be endowed with the ability to distinguish among instances of
some or all the attributes in 𝐾 (more explicitly, we characterize such an ability as a “type-specific
awareness” by using an appropriate information correspondence). d) Given this, we impose a
“labeling-invariance” constraint on the strategies one defines on the basis of the attributes of which
one is aware. e) We finally specify equilibria under the assumption that there is no uncertainty
about other players’ perceptual descriptions (“frame-induced equilibria”).15
a. For any subset of attributes 𝐾 ′ with 𝐾 ′ ⊆ 𝐾, let Ω𝐾′ denote a set of tuples of labels, with
generic member 𝜔, so that each state 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝐾′ represents a description of the available action set
(i.e., each action is described by an instance of each attribute 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 ′ ).16 For example, suppose
Nature has selected a game with action set {𝑠𝑖,1 , 𝑠𝑖,2 , 𝑠𝑖,3 }: here, if 𝐾 ′ = {C, S}, then a state 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝐾′
may be represented by 𝜔 = ((𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒), (𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒)), so that

14

More precisely, each of those 20 games is a proper subgame of the larger game that begins with a chance move.
However, since there is perfect information about the chance move, to simplify the exposition we shall treat each of the
proper subgames as a distinct “game” and hence use the words actions and strategies interchangeably.
15
The case in which there is any such uncertainty is presented in section III.2 below.
16
The reader may anticipate that if 𝐾 ′ = {∅}, then every action is described by an instance of a “nondescript attribute”
conveying no particular information; e.g., (𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡).
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(𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒) describes the (attributes color and shape of the) first action, (𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑)

describes the second action, and (𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒) describes the third action.
b. Let {Ω𝐾′ }𝐾′⊆𝐾 denote a collection of nonempty sets Ω𝐾′ (i.e., there is one set for each
𝐾 ′ ⊆ 𝐾 ). By construction, such sets are disjoint; moreover, for any 𝐾 ′ , 𝐾 ′′ ⊆ 𝐾 , the construction

naturally lends itself to the interpretation that Ω𝐾′′ “is more expressive than” Ω𝐾′ if 𝐾 ′′ ⊇ 𝐾 ′ . In
other words, if 𝐾 ′′ ⊇ 𝐾 ′ , then Ω𝐾′′ is more expressive in that it provides a description of the action
set in terms of a larger number of attributes than Ω𝐾′ . Further, for any 𝐾 ′ , 𝐾 ′′ ⊆ 𝐾 with 𝐾 ′′ ⊇ 𝐾 ′ , a
surjective projection from Ω𝐾′′ to Ω𝐾′ is naturally defined by “erasing” (in 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝐾′′ ) any 𝑘-instance
in 𝐾 ′′ \𝐾 ′.17 For example, if 𝐾 ′ = {C} and 𝐾 ′′ = {C, S}, then 𝜔 =
((𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒), (𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒)) ∈ Ω𝐾′′ projects to
((𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛), (𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛), (𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟)) ∈ Ω𝐾′ . For a graphic representation, see Figure 1 below.

c. We move on to explicitly relate the variously-expressive descriptions above to different
player types. In order to define players’ information correspondences, we begin by letting Ω∗
∶= ⋃𝐾′ ⊆𝐾 Ω𝐾′ . Given this, we assume that for each player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 there is a correspondence 𝐼𝑖 : Ω∗ ⟶
Ω∗ such that, for each 𝐾 ′ ⊆ 𝐾 and for each 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝐾′ , 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔) is the projection to some Ω𝐾′′ with 𝐾 ′′ ⊆
𝐾 ′ . Note that 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔) is interpreted as “player 𝑖 ’s possibly partial perception (hence, labeling) of the

action set described in 𝜔”. For example, if 𝜔 =
((𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒), (𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒)) and 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔) ∈ Ω{C} , then player 𝑖 ignores the

shape attribute and focuses solely on the colors of the actions; that is, 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔) =
((𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛), (𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛), (𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟)). It is easy to verify that 𝐼𝑖 satisfies all the properties of the possibility

correspondence introduced to model unawareness structures in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006).
Note that our model is indeed a special case of an unawareness structure, whereby a player is aware
of an attribute 𝑘 if she distinguishes among different instances of that attribute. Also note that, so
far, we have not modeled any uncertainty about the others’ perception; therefore, the information
correspondence 𝐼𝑖 simply amounts to an indicator of how each action set is labeled by player 𝑖
(again, note that we model uncertainty in III.2 below).
d. Here we posit that, for each player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, there is a strategy 𝜎𝑖 assigning to each tuple 𝜔 ∈
Ω∗ a probability distribution over the elements of 𝜔, with the property that 𝜎𝑖 (𝜔) ≡ 𝜎𝑖 (𝐼𝑖 (𝜔)). This

means that 𝑖’s strategy at 𝜔 depends on 𝑖’s own perception of 𝜔, that is, 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔). In this regard, while
it is common in game theory to define a strategy as a mapping from information sets to actions, we
17

The symbol \ denotes set difference.
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stress that our definition rests on an unawareness structure: as such, it appropriately ties one’s
behavior to one’s (however partial) perception of the game.
Now, denote the (ordered) elements in a tuple 𝜔 by ((𝑎1 ), (𝑎2 ), … ) so that we refer to the
first cell of 𝜔 as 𝑎1 , to the second cell of 𝜔 as 𝑎2 , etc. Given this, we say that:
DEFINITION 1—a strategy of player 𝑖 is “labeling-invariant” if 𝜎𝑖 (𝜔)(𝑎) = 𝜎𝑖 (𝜔)(𝑎′ ) whenever
𝑎 = 𝑎′ in 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔), for any two cells 𝑎, 𝑎′ ∈ 𝜔, with 𝜔 ∈ Ω∗ .
For example, if 𝜔 =
((𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡, 𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒), (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑, 𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑, 𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒)) and 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔) =
((𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛), (𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛), (𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟)), then a strategy is labeling-invariant if 𝜎𝑖 (𝜔) assigns the same

probability to cyan objects 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 ; i.e., if 𝜎𝑖 (𝜔)(𝑎1 ) = 𝜎𝑖 (𝜔)(𝑎2 ). We note that such a notion of
labeling-invariance uses Bernoulli’s principle of insufficient reason in the following sense: if some
actions are indistinguishable (given the player’s labeling), then those actions should be assigned the
same probability in a mixed strategy.18

Figure 1 - State spaces and projections in Choose Something. Note: the computer program identifies
blocks 𝑏 by the numbers 1-6 (such numbers are invisible to the players regardless of their type); the
state perceived by each player depends on publicly-observed permutations of the theorist’s indexing of
strategies (𝑠𝑖,𝑏 ). As an example, only states involving blocks 1-3 are displayed (for visual clarity, state
spaces Ω{C,S} , Ω{C,O} , and Ω{S,O} are not displayed).
Interestingly, in Choose Something, the labeling-invariance principle says that players who describe each action
merely as an “𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡” (i.e., players who are solely aware of the nondescript attribute ∅) should behave as was postulated
by Harsanyi and Selten (1988); that is, they should randomize uniformly over all actions.
18
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e. For any 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, we define player 𝑖’s expected payoff from strategy profile (𝜎𝑖 )𝑖∈𝑁 at 𝜔 ∈
Ω∗ by 𝑈𝑖 (𝜎𝑖 (𝐼𝑖 (𝜔)), 𝜎𝑗 (𝐼𝑗 (𝐼𝑖 (𝜔)))).19 Given this, we provide our first solution concept.

DEFINITION 2—a profile of strategies (𝜎𝑖 )𝑖∈𝑁 is said to be a “frame-induced” equilibrium if, for
each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝜎𝑖 is labeling-invariant and (𝜎𝑖 )𝑖∈𝑁 is a Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game in
strategic form defined as follows: The set of players is specified by the player-perception pairs
{(𝑖, 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔)): 𝑖 = 1,2; 𝜔 ∈ Ω∗ }. The set of actions of player (𝑖, 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔)) corresponds to the labeling of the
action set, as in 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔). The payoff to player (𝑖, 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔)) is given by 𝑈𝑖 (𝜎𝑖 (𝐼𝑖 (𝜔)), 𝜎𝑗 (𝐼𝑗 (𝐼𝑖 (𝜔)))).
The auxiliary game defined above is a modeling construct to incorporate the players’ way of
identifying actions (as determined by their partial perception of attributes) into the analysis of play.
Note that each player-perception pair (𝑖, 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔)) defines a distinct (labeling) type, though such a
modeling construct does not specify a type’s uncertainty about the labels used by other types. In a
nutshell, it is assumed that each type chooses a strategy, with a strategy being defined as a
probability distribution over the elements of 𝜔, as perceived by the type herself. It is clear that in a
frame-induced equilibrium each type chooses a best-reply conditional on her (possibly partial)
perception. So, when player 𝑖 with perception 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔) – i.e., “type (𝑖, 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔))” – considers the strategies
of opponent 𝑗, she actually imagines 𝑗’s action set at 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔) and not necessarily at 𝜔 (this is because
that type may not be aware of all the attributes used to describe actions at 𝜔)!20
The discussion above implies that at 𝜔 player 1 may expect player 2 to play 𝜎2 (𝐼2 (𝐼1 (𝜔))),
while in fact player 2 plays 𝜎2 (𝐼2 (𝜔)), with 𝜎2 (𝐼2 (𝐼1 (𝜔))) ≠ 𝜎2 (𝐼2 (𝜔)). To ensure that no such
surprise may arise in equilibrium, as a first remedy one could make the assumption that players
have common labeling. In that case, for 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, one would require that 𝐼𝑖 and 𝐼𝑗 are equal in that
𝐼𝑖 (𝜔) = 𝐼𝑗 (𝜔) at each 𝜔 ∈ Ω∗ . It is clear that a tuple 𝜔 now unambiguously identifies an action set

(hence, a game) in the players’ language. For example, suppose 𝜔 =
((𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡, 𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒), (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑, 𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑, 𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒)) and 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔) =
((𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛), (𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛), (𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟)), with 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔) = 𝐼𝑗 (𝜔). Recalling that a strategy is labeling-invariant if it
Payoffs are a function of perceived (i.e., labeled) strategies. Specifically, 𝑖’s strategy is defined by 𝜎𝑖 (𝐼𝑖 (𝜔)) as per
point d) above. Then, from 𝑖’s viewpoint, 𝑗’s strategy is defined by 𝜎𝑗 (𝐼𝑗 (𝐼𝑖 (𝜔))); that is, it depends on 𝑗’s perception of
the state that 𝑖 perceives at 𝜔.
20
A frame-induced equilibrium may be viewed as a special case of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for games with
unawareness (Meier and Schipper, 2014).
19
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assigns the same probability to actions that have the same label, it is easy to verify that this game
has three frame-induced equilibria, whereby both players choose one of the following probability
1 1 1

1 1

distributions over 𝜔 (i.e., mixed strategies): (3 , 3 , 3), (2 , 2 , 0), (0,0,1).21 Since – in a matching
game – each player’s payoff is a positive number 𝜋 if both choose the same action, the equilibria
1

1

above have expected payoffs of 3 𝜋, 2 𝜋, and 1𝜋, respectively: this implies that playing the color
oddity (i.e., lavender) with probability one is the payoff-dominant solution. The analysis above
motivates the following concept.
DEFINITION 3—a strategy 𝜎𝑖 is “frame-appropriate” for player 𝑖 with perception 𝐼𝑖 (𝜔) if it is
labeling-invariant, and it does not induce a payoff-dominated outcome (of the auxiliary game) in the
event that player 𝑗 chooses a strategy 𝜎𝑗 such that 𝜎𝑗 = 𝜎𝑖 .
The definition offers a rather weak (but intuitive) characterization of appropriateness in
coordination games. In brief, frame-appropriateness discards a labeling-invariant strategy if it leads
to inefficient outcomes whenever an opponent with a certain type-specific perception chooses the
same strategy. This will later serve as a sensible constraint on beliefs about those players with a
given type-specific perception.
2. Frame-dependent rationalizability
The frame-induced equilibrium is unsatisfactory as an equilibrium concept, in that it cannot
convincingly be interpreted as a stable solution. The instability is due to the surprises that may arise
if players do not happen to have common labeling, or simply due to the fact that players might learn
new attributes (e.g., as a result of an experimental manipulation). To provide a more compelling
solution concept for games with heterogenous perception – and uncertainty about others’ labelings –
we introduce “frame-dependent rationalizability”. This concept is derived from the interim
correlated rationalizability notion of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007), although in our case we
shall account for (type-specific) partial perception.
To that end, we first define an extended state in such a way to specify not only instances of
attributes, but also a labeling type for each player. Formally, we shall expand Ω𝐾′ into the state

21

As another example, suppose 𝜔 = ((𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡, 𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒), (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑, 𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑, 𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒)) like
before, but now players ignore any attributes: in this case, every action is described by an instance of a “nondescript
attribute”; e.g., (𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡). It is clear that this game has only one frame-induced equilibrium, where both
1 1 1
players choose (3 , 3 , 3).
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̅ 𝐾′ , where Ω
̅ 𝐾′ ∶= Ω𝐾′ × 2𝐾 × 2𝐾 .22 For example, the extended state 𝜔
space Ω
̅=
(((𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒), (𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒)), {C}, {C, S}) contains a description of the

action set, as well as player 1’s labeling type {C} (i.e., color) and player 2’s labeling type {C, S} (i.e.,
̅ ∗ the union of the extended state spaces, that is, Ω
̅∗
color&shape). Next, we denote by Ω
̅ 𝐾′ . Given this, we introduce a type mapping 𝜇𝑖 such that 𝜇𝑖 : Ω
̅ ∗ ⟶ ⋃𝐾′ ⊆𝐾 ∆(Ω
̅ 𝐾′ ). We
∶= ⋃𝐾′ ⊆𝐾 Ω

interpret 𝜇𝑖 (𝜔
̅) as “player 𝑖 ’s belief about 𝑗’s perception, given 𝑖 ’s possibly partial perception at 𝜔
̅ ”.
Simply put, such a mapping associates with each state 𝜔
̅ a probability over the 𝑗 types of which 𝑖
can conceive. (As such, unlike the information correspondence 𝐼𝑖 we used above, 𝜇𝑖 defines both 𝑖’s
type and 𝑖’s beliefs about others.) Note that the type mapping is defined in such a way that 𝑖 knows
𝑖 ’s own “awareness level” at state 𝜔
̅ is some 𝐾 ′ .23 For example, if player 𝑖 is aware of color and

order – but not shape – then 𝑖 can conceive of the opponent labeling the action set in terms of a
(weak) subset of the attributes of which she herself is aware; that is, 𝑖 can conceive of the opponent
labeling the action set in terms of color & order, only color, only order, and neither color nor order.
More explicitly, this means that the type mapping 𝜇𝑖 for this particular player will assign a
probabilistic belief only to 𝑗 types that describe the action set in terms of color & order, only color,
only order, and neither color nor order. (One can verify that 𝜇𝑖 satisfies the common properties of
type mappings in unawareness structures; for a formal presentation of such properties, see Heifetz,
Meier, and Schipper, 2013.)
We now present our notion of rationalizability. Dekel et al. (2007) introduce interim
correlated rationalizability to capture interactions where there is a correlation between the state of
the world and players’ conjectures about the actions of others. Like the standard notion of
rationalizability in complete-information games (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984), their concept is
defined via an iterated-deletion procedure. At each round, an action survives for a type only if: (i) it
is a best response to a belief attaching positive probability to type-actions pairs of the opponents
that have not yet been deleted; (ii) it is consistent with that type’s beliefs about others and chance.
In order to allow for unawareness, we modify such a notion so that 𝑖 does not best-respond to all 𝑗
types, but only to those of which 𝑖 can conceive (i.e., consistent with 𝜇𝑖 ). Another key difference is
that we exploit frames by imposing a constraint on 𝑖’s beliefs about the actions of each 𝑗 type (of

′

2𝐾 denotes the power set of 𝐾 ′ .
23
Obviously, if 𝑖 discovers new attributes (e.g., as a result of an experimental manipulation), then a different state
obtains. In that case, the construction of 𝜇𝑖 implies that 𝑖 will know 𝑖’s new awareness level is 𝐾 ′′ , with 𝐾 ′′ ⊇ 𝐾 ′ .
22
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which 𝑖 can think): we do so by assuming that such beliefs are derived from strategies that are
frame-appropriate for each 𝑗 type (in turn) to which 𝜇𝑖 assigns a probability.
Formally, we define frame-dependent rationalizable actions at round 𝑞 = 0 as 𝑅𝑖,𝑞=0 (𝜔
̅)
∶= 𝑆, where 𝑆 denotes a list of actions – as identified by the theorist – that is symmetric with respect

to the players. The list 𝑆 has generic members 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 for players 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, respectively (𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗
are interpreted as the theorist’s representation of the choice each player type makes in her own
language). We then denote by 𝑢𝑖 ((𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗 ), 𝜔
̅) player 𝑖 ’s utility at 𝜔
̅ . Frame-dependent
rationalizability is defined inductively, as follows.
DEFINITION 4—the set of frame-dependent rationalizable actions at 𝑞 + 1 is
𝑅𝑖,𝑞+1 (𝜔
̅)
̅ 𝑖,𝜔
there exists 𝑣 ∈ Δ(𝑆 × Ω
̅ ) such that
̅ ′ }) > 0 ⟹ 𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑅𝑗,𝑞 (𝜔
(1) 𝑣 ({𝑠𝑗 , 𝜔
̅′)
∶= 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆:

(2) 𝑠𝑖 ∈ arg max ∑
𝑠̂ 𝑖 ∈𝑆

(3) ∑

𝑣 ({𝑠𝑗 , 𝜔
̅ ′ }) =

𝑠𝑗 ∈𝑆

{

̅ 𝑖,𝜔
̅ ′ )∈𝑆×Ω
(𝑠𝑗 , 𝜔
̅

𝑢𝑖 ((𝑠̂𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗 ), 𝜔
̅ ′ ) ⋅ 𝑣 ({𝑠𝑗 , 𝜔
̅ ′ })

𝜇𝑖 (𝜔
̅)({𝜔
̅ ′ })

(4) 𝑣 ({𝑠𝑗 , 𝜔
̅ ′ }) is derived from strategies frame-appropriate at 𝜇𝑖 (𝜔
̅)({𝜔
̅ ′ }) }

and 𝑅𝑖 (𝜔
̅) = ⋂∞
̅).
𝑞=1 𝑅𝑖,𝑞 (𝜔
In plain words, there exists a probability measure 𝑣 defined on the Cartesian product of 𝑗’s
̅ 𝑖,𝜔
actions and the states of which 𝑖 can conceive (note: Ω
̅ denotes the collection of state spaces to

which 𝜇𝑖 (𝜔
̅) assigns a probabilistic belief). Given this, 𝑖 chooses a best response to 𝑣 that puts
positive probability only on type-actions pairs of the opponents that have not yet been eliminated
(per conditions 1 and 2). Further, 𝑣 must be consistent with 𝑖’s type belief 𝜇𝑖 (condition 3). Finally,
when possible (i.e., when the labeling-invariance principle has bite), 𝑣 must be consistent with
strategies that are frame-appropriate at 𝜇𝑖 (𝜔
̅)({𝜔
̅ ′ }); that is, 𝑗’s actions are believed to be frameappropriate according to 𝑗’s perception at state 𝜔
̅ ′ , given 𝑖 ’s own perception at 𝜔
̅ (condition 4).
EXAMPLE. Suppose that, in Choose Something, Nature has selected object no. 5 (turquoise,
diamond), no. 2 (cyan, diamond), and no. 6 (turquoise, pentagon); more specifically, let 𝜔 =
((𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡, 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑, 𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑, 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛)). As an

example, we analyze a type of player 𝑖 who is aware of color and order, which means that the type
̅ 𝑖,𝜔
mapping 𝜇𝑖 for this particular player assigns a probabilistic belief only to Ω
̅ =
̅ {C,O} , Ω
̅ {C} , Ω
̅ {O} , Ω
̅ {∅} }. We begin by considering some 𝑖 who attaches positive probability to a type
{Ω
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̅ {C,O} . In this case, the labeling-invariance principle imposes no constraint on
of 𝑗 who is aware of Ω
𝑗’s actions, as a description in terms of color & order implies three distinct

labels, (𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡, 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒), (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑, 𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛), (𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑, 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒); so, condition 4 above has no bite. We
̅ {C} : with
then consider some 𝑖 who attaches positive probability to a type of 𝑗 who is aware of Ω

some abuse of notation, we compactly refer to this belief as 𝜇𝑖C . Here the labeling-invariance
principle imposes a constraint, as a description in terms of color implies just two labels
(i.e., (𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒), (𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛), (𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒)); it follows that the only frame-appropriate strategy here
involves 𝑗 playing each of the turquoise objects with probability zero, and the cyan object with
probability one.24 We next turn to some 𝑖 who attaches positive probability to a type of 𝑗 who is
̅ {O} . Now the labeling-invariance principle imposes no constraint on 𝑖 ’s beliefs about 𝑗, as
aware of Ω

a description in terms of order here involves three labels (i.e., (𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡), (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑)). We then
̅ {∅} , in which
move on to some 𝑖 who attaches positive probability to a type of 𝑗 who is aware of Ω

case 𝑗 describes each action as an “𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡”. Here the labeling-invariance principle imposes a
1

constraint (playing each object with prob. 3), which determines the frame-appropriate strategy.
Given the above, it follows that – for any 𝜇𝑖 assigning positive probability to the event that
“others are aware of color differences” (i.e., compactly, for any positive 𝜇𝑖C ) – the unique framedependent rationalizable action is the color oddity (i.e., cyan). Finally, the reader might wish to
consider alternative type mappings. Regardless of the specific mapping considered, the general
insight is intuitive: given the attributes of which one is aware, one will best-respond solely to the
actions of co-player types of which one can conceive. When different co-player types have different
frame-appropriate strategies, then beliefs about the likelihood of those types (as defined by one’s
type mapping 𝜇𝑖 ) become key to frame-dependent rationalizability.25
24

Specifically, the labeling-invariance principle imposes a constraint whereby strategies that are indistinguishable with
respect to the color labeling should be assigned the same probability. Then, definition 3 implies that a strategy is frameappropriate for a player with color perception, if the strategy is labeling-invariant with respect to the color frame and it
does not induce a payoff-dominated outcome in the event that a co-player chooses the same strategy. It follows that the
only frame-appropriate strategy here involves playing the cyan object with probability one.
25
As another example, suppose 𝑖 is aware of color and order like before, but now 𝜔 =
((𝑡𝑜𝑝, 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝑐𝑦𝑎𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛)). Here the analysis is the same as
̅ {O} : we denote this
above, except for the case of some 𝑖 who attaches positive probability to a type of 𝑗 who is aware of Ω
O
belief by 𝜇𝑖 . The labeling-invariance principle here imposes a constraint, as a description in terms of order now implies
just two labels (i.e., (𝑡𝑜𝑝), (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟), (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟)); so, strategies that are indistinguishable with respect to the order labeling
should be assigned the same probability. It follows that the only frame-appropriate strategy here involves 𝑗 playing top
with probability one. Finally, for any type mapping 𝜇𝑖 such that 𝜇𝑖C ≤ 𝜇𝑖O , the unique frame-dependent rationalizable
action is the top object. Instead, for any 𝜇𝑖 whereby order types are considered less likely than color types (formally,
𝜇𝑖C > 𝜇𝑖O ), then the unique frame-dependent rationalizable action is the color oddity (i.e., cyan).
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IV. Predictions
Our experimental design brings about different frames by manipulating subjects’ awareness
of several attributes. This allows us to investigate the perception-action chain:
awareness of attributes 𝐾 ⟶ 𝐾-induced frame ⟶ behavior. A frame may be thought of as a
player’s description of the available actions in terms of the attributes of which she is aware. Our
theory provides a formal account of the effect of manipulating awareness (of alternative framings)
on strategic behavior, via two “channels”, as follows. First, the player’s awareness level affects the
frames, hence the types, one can consider. Second – for any fixed awareness level – behavior varies
with one’s beliefs about the attributes of which (one thinks) others are aware.26 Given this, our
experimental design controls both for a subject’s awareness level (which is exogenously varied) and
for a subject’s probabilistic beliefs about the others’ awareness (with such beliefs being elicited in
the All-Aware treatment). This allows for a direct test of frame-dependent rationalizability.
Our first hypothesis addresses the first channel above.27 In short, we assume that each
Baseline participant is endowed with a particular frame (or set of frames); we further assume that
All-Aware participants – prior to the treatment manipulation – are similar to their Baseline
counterparts (on average), but eventually become aware of additional frames as a result of their
exposure to the “All-Aware questions” (see pp. 8-9). A natural consequence is that an increase in
frame awareness may reduce an individual’s reliance on the prior (unobservable) frames, thereby
affecting the frequency with which participants choose oddities in the All-Aware treatment, as
compared with the Baseline.
H1. An increase in frame awareness weakly reduces an individual’s reliance on the prior
(unobservable) frames. As a result, the frequency with which participants choose (color or shape)
oddities varies across the Baseline and the All-Aware treatments.
Our next hypotheses will delve into the directional effects of our experimental manipulation,
addressing the second channel above. Before doing so, we shall first elaborate on the intuition
behind H1. To that end, we stress that the All-Aware treatment is identical to the Baseline except
that, in the former, our treatment manipulation makes subjects privately aware of multiple
26

In our model, such beliefs are specified by 𝜇𝑖 (𝜔
̅).
The experimental design and hypotheses were deposited into the AEA’s registry for randomized controlled trials,
prior to running the present study. The registration form is available at https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4219-1.0 (Charness,
Gary and Alessandro Sontuoso. 2019. “The Doors of Perception.” AEA RCT Registry. May 20).
27
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attributes. It follows that the behavior of a subject who (prior to the All-Aware manipulation) had
been unaware of some of those attributes might be affected by the fact that we mention them in the
All-Aware treatment. Indeed, any differences in choice behavior between All-Aware and Baseline
can be attributed to the fact that, in the former, one comes to consider additional frames (i.e., a fact
that may impact one’s rationalizable actions). For example, some All-Aware participants – who
prior to the treatment manipulation had only been aware of color differences – might come to
believe that a newly-discovered frame is most likely considered by others: this would imply a fall in
the frequency of All-Aware participants choosing color oddities.28 Regardless of the specific
example, we stress that the effect of the All-Aware manipulation is to deterministically change the
calculus of coordination, as is clarified by the discussion of our next hypotheses.
Our second hypothesis – with its two components H2.a and H2.b – puts to test the notion of
frame-dependent rationalizability more directly by focusing on the sample of All-Aware
participants. We begin by introducing H2.a, which addresses the case in which a subject believes
that others are more likely to consider (non-stochastic) attributes such as color and shape.29
H2.a. The frequency with which All-Aware participants choose color (shape) oddities is positively
related to their belief about others noticing the different colors (shapes).
What does H2.a specifically entail? To answer this question, recall that our model implies
that when different co-player types have different frame-appropriate strategies, then beliefs about
the likelihood of those types (as defined by one’s type mapping 𝜇𝑖 ) are key for determining
28

Whether the All-Aware manipulation results in an increase or a decrease in the frequency of choice of (color or
shape) oddities depends on two concurrent elements. In short, All-Aware participants are less likely to choose a color
oddity than Baseline participants, if: (i) one typically considers the color frame and no other frames, unless exposed to
the All-Aware questions; and (ii) after learning about all frames, one believes that others (who were not exposed to
those questions) are more likely to consider another frame than the color frame. Conversely, All-Aware participants are
more likely to choose a color oddity than Baseline participants, if: (i) one typically ignores the color frame, unless
exposed to the All-Aware questions; and (ii) after learning about all frames, one believes that others (not exposed to
those questions) are more likely to consider the color frame than another frame. Since the experimenter cannot possibly
observe individuals’ prior frames, our next hypotheses will corroborate whether our interpretation (of any Baseline vs.
All-Aware differences) is correct and consistent with our theory.
29
A “stochastic attribute” is an attribute that implies a stochastic labeling procedure, in the sense that the assignment of
a label to an action is randomly determined. For example, consider a subject who refers to the blocks using the list of
labels ((𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡), (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑)). Given this, a round of Choose Something entails 120 possible stochastic labelings
(i.e., given a set of six blocks, there are 20 triplets and 6 permutations for each triplet). In each of those 120 labelings
the blocks are named in the same way – i.e., (𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡), (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑) – but which object is labeled, say, “first”
eventually depends on the random draw. Instead, consider a subject who refers to the blocks as a list of colors: in this
case the random draw only determines which colors are “available”, but the assignment of a label to an action is not
randomly determined, since color is an intrinsic property of objects (from the perspective of the human eye). In other
words, whether a block is named blue rather than red here depends on a non-stochastic element, such as the stimulation
of cone cells in the human eye.
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rationalizable actions. Hence, if an All-Aware participant believes that her counterpart is more
likely to notice colors than shapes or order, then she should choose a color oddity. Instead, if an
All-Aware participant believes that her counterpart is more likely to notice shapes than colors or
order, then she should choose a shape oddity. [As a side note, recall that All-Aware participants are
told that they are assigned a (Baseline) partner who is not exposed to the extra questions in PART B
of the experiment (see pp. 8-9 above). In order to keep Baseline participants’ awareness level
unchanged, Baseline participants do not know about their partners’ extra questions.]
It is worth stressing that our hypotheses are incompatible with the standard Bayesian
paradigm. According to that paradigm, behavioral responses to the acquisition of new information
can only happen as a result of the shrinking (not the expansion!) of the set of possible events: a fact
that precludes unawareness.30 By contrast, our model allows for the set of possible events to
expand, and therefore for a decision-maker to react to novel information (in the form of a newlydiscovered frame) by maximizing an updated frame-dependent expected utility. More explicitly: if
H2 is confirmed, then we will have evidence that subjects do attempt to maximize a framedependent expected utility function; further, if H1 is confirmed as well (i.e., if there are differences
between Baseline and All-Aware), then we will have evidence that the expected utility function AllAware participants are attempting to maximize has been updated.
We turn to the analysis of the order frame. Before formulating our next hypothesis, we note
that while the color and shape attributes imply a fairly straightforward (and non-stochastic)
description for each block, the same is not true in the case of the order attribute. Depending on the
emphasis one puts on each of the objects’ positions, the order attribute might well entail any of the
following lists of labels: (i) ((𝑡𝑜𝑝), (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟), (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟)); (ii) ((𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟), (𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒), (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟));
(iii) ((𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟), (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟), (𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚)); (iv) ((𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡), (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑), (𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑)).31 Whereas frame (iv) generates
no order oddities, frames (i), (ii), (iii) would respectively pull a subject toward the top, middle, and
bottom blocks, and hence possibly away from color or shape oddities. Now, the experimenter could
use any of the order lists above as the basis for a null hypothesis, to formulate a prediction about the
relationship between one’s order awareness and one’s tendency to (consistently) choose the distinct
30

More precisely: in the standard Bayesian paradigm, the set of possible events shrinks whenever one acquires novel
information; this is because conditioning on new data necessarily implies that one assigns probability zero to events that
had previously been assigned positive probabilities.
31
It is clear that each order frame has a number of equivalent translations that do not affect the application of the
labeling-invariance principle. For example, list (iv) is equivalent to ((𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑛), (𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑖), (𝑠ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖)), and to
((𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑜), (𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑜), (𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑧𝑜)), and to ((𝑡𝑜𝑝), (𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒), (𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚)), etc.
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(nth) object in a list. That said, we know from research in memory and cognition that individuals’
order encoding is often characterized by a “primacy effect” where the first few items in a list are
recalled more frequently than later items (Murdock, 1962; Rundus, 1971).32 Since recognizability
and memory are key determinants of perceived salience, we shall make the default assumption that
our mention of the order attribute (in the All-Aware treatment) likely induces frame (i) above. This
in turn implies a relationship between one’s belief about the “others’ order awareness” and one’s
tendency to consistently choose the top block (see example in footnote 25). This leads to the
specification of H2.b below.
H2.b. The frequency with which All-Aware participants choose top or middle, or bottom objects –
regardless of whether there are any color or shape oddities – varies with their belief about others
noticing the order of the objects. In particular, if one believes that others are more likely to notice
the objects’ order (rather than colors or shapes), then one is more likely to choose the top block.
We proceed to formulate hypotheses relating to our supplemental treatments. Before stating
such hypotheses, we stress that each of the Color-Aware, Shape-Aware, and Order-Aware
treatments is the same as the Baseline except that the objects are exogenously labeled in terms of
colors, shapes, or the order in which the blocks are displayed, respectively. The purpose of the
treatments is to bring about different subject pools, whereby each pool is characterized by common
awareness of the relevant attribute. We begin by considering the Color- and Shape-Aware
treatments.
H3. Color- and Shape-Aware participants choose (respectively color and shape) oddities weakly
more frequently than Baseline participants.
Notably, H3 predicts that Color- and Shape-Aware participants will choose (respectively
color and shape) oddities weakly more frequently than Baseline participants.33 This is because, by
inducing common awareness of either attribute, such treatments make a subject believe that her
assigned partner has considered the relevant frame, and hence oddity (if there is one).

More specifically, there is well established evidence of a strong – possibly exponential – primacy effect extending
over the first 3 or 4 items in a list, as well as evidence of an S-shaped recency effect extending over the last 8 items in a
list. This implies that the primacy effect is stronger in short lists (Murdock, 1962; Rundus, 1971).
33
We expect (at worst) a weak increase in the frequency of choice of the relevant (color or shape) oddity, since the
treatment manipulation can impact only those subjects who – absent the manipulation – would not believe their partner
to consider the relevant frame with certainty. Note that the experimenter has no a priori knowledge of such subjective
probabilities.
32
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Finally, we discuss a null effect of the Order-Aware treatment manipulation, predicted
below.
H4. Order-Aware participants choose (color or shape) oddities with the same frequency as Baseline
participants.
In the case of the Order-Aware treatment, we solely implemented frame (iv) above – i.e.,
“first”, “second”, “third” – thereby highlighting the sequential nature of the available actions
without generating oddities. It follows from our notion of rationalizability that Order-Aware
participants in this case will choose color or shape oddities just as frequently as Baseline
participants. Again, this is because the order frame we implemented does not generate oddities, and
therefore the labeling-invariance principle has no bite here. (This means that even if one were
previously unaware of such a frame, its discovery would never entail a different best-reply with
respect to one’s prior frames; see the main example in section III.2.)

V. Experimental results
1. Summary statistics and regression models
Sessions were conducted at UCSB, where subjects were recruited from a broad spectrum of
academic departments with the help of ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). On average, a session had about 18
subjects and lasted about 40 minutes, with a mean payoff of about $12 per subject (including a $5
show-up fee), and with minimum and maximum earnings of $6.50 and $17.50, respectively. No
subject was allowed to participate in more than one session.
A total of 212 subjects took part in our sessions, with each subject playing 10 different
instances of Choose Something. The number of participants (per treatment) was 54 in each of the
main treatments – i.e., Baseline and All-Aware – over a total of six sessions. The number of
participants in our supplemental treatments was 34 in Color-Aware, 32 in Shape-Aware, and 38 in
Order-Aware (with each of the supplemental treatments comprising two sessions).
For each of the five treatments, Table 2 presents mean choices (in the upper panel), along
with mean guesses about the likelihood of the others’ choosing the top, middle, and bottom objects
(lower panel). With specific reference to these guesses, we note that such data should not be
confused with the beliefs about others noticing the various attributes, which were only elicited from
All-Aware participants and shall be discussed later.

22

Here we report some preliminary tests addressing the above-discussed hypotheses. Later on
we also perform a more formal regression analysis controlling for any round fixed-effects. Before
doing so, to sketch a rough outline of the main patterns emerging from our dataset, we initially treat
each choice as an independent observation. Note that this is justified by a few elements: (i) no
feedback was given between rounds; (ii) in each round a different three-object selection (“triplet”)
was implemented by the program; (iii) in each round subjects were randomly assigned to another
pair, and were so informed (i.e., a “random matching” protocol).
Base

All-A

Color-A

Shape-A Order-A

Top of column is chosen, %

40.18

50.00

43.23

33.13

45.53

Center of column is chosen, %

33.15

26.30

33.53

41.56

33.42

Bottom of column is chosen, %

26.67

23.70

23.24

25.31

21.05

100

100

100

100

100

Top of column is chosen, %

35.02

38.11

34.55

32.31

35.99

Center of column is chosen, %

33.44

32.21

34.03

35.65

33.61

Bottom of column is chosen, %

31.54

29.68

31.42

32.04

30.40

Total, %

100

100

100

100

100

# observations

540

540

340

320

380

Choice (by location)

Total, %

Guess (by location)

Table 2 - The upper panel shows the frequency of play of each object in a triplet, given a classification
of the blocks based on their position (i.e., top, middle, or bottom of the column). The lower panel
shows mean guesses about the others’ choices, again by position: see task iv. on p. 8 above. The
number of observations equals the number of subjects in the relevant treatment times the number of
triplets (i.e., 10 rounds).

A glance at the upper panel of Table 2 reveals that the distribution of choices varies across
treatments. This provides some first evidence in support of the thesis that treatment-induced
awareness affects choice behavior. In fact, we stress that all treatments featured exactly the same
ordered triplets, so that the position of the oddities did not differ across treatments, whereas
subjects’ awareness of any such oddities varied as a result of the treatments to which they were
assigned. A chi-square test conducted on the entire choice dataset confirms that there is a
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statistically-significant relationship between a subject’s choice and the treatment a subject was
assigned to: N = 2,120 obs., 𝜒82 = 32.797, p = 0.000, two-tailed.34,35 Similarly, the lower panel of
Table 2 indicates that guesses about the others’ choices vary across treatments. In particular, our
belief dataset shows statistically-significant differences across the five treatments (N = 2,120 obs.),
with respect to a subject’s beliefs about others choosing the top block (𝜒42 = 54.965, p = 0.000, twotailed Kruskal-Wallis test), or the middle block (𝜒42 = 58.113, p = 0.000, two-tailed), or the bottom
block (𝜒42 = 51.896, p = 0.000, two-tailed).36 Our analysis below will further illuminate the
relationship between beliefs, awareness-types, and choice behavior.
We move on to test for H1 by restricting our attention to the choice dataset from the
Baseline and the All-Aware treatments only—see the relevant columns in the upper panel of Table
2. A chi-square test indicates that there is a statistically-significant relationship between one’s
choice (by location) and the (Baseline vs. All-Aware) treatment to which one was assigned: N =
1,080 obs., 𝜒22 = 10.973, p = 0.004, two-tailed. Such treatment-induced differences in choice
distributions provide indirect evidence in support of H1, that is, the hypothesis that the frequency
with which participants choose oddities varies across the Baseline and the All-Aware treatments
(again, this is because the position of the oddities did not differ across treatments).
In order to delve deeper into the treatment effects, probe their robustness, and control for
any clustering in the data, Table 3 reports a simple multinomial-logit model that consists of a
subject’s choice as the dependent variable and of the following predictors: (i) a dummy for each
treatment (indicating whether a subject was assigned to that treatment or to the Baseline); (ii) a set
of dummies indicating whether there was a color or shape oddity in each position.

Similarly, a Hotelling’s T-squared generalized means test confirms that a subject’s virtual mixed strategy (i.e., a
randomized strategy obtained by averaging the subject’s top, middle, and bottom choices over 10 rounds, i.e., triplets)
significantly differed across treatments: N = 212 obs., 𝜒82 = 17.62, p = 0.024. (The Hotelling’s test is simply a
multivariate generalization of the t test.)
35
Additionally, Hotelling’s T-squared generalized means tests – conducted on the sample of per-subject mean choices –
reveal that behavior in each of the treatments significantly differed from the fully-mixed equilibrium assigning equal
probability to all actions (for Baseline: N = 54 obs., 𝑇 2 = 8.48, p = 0.021; for All-Aware: N = 54 obs., 𝑇 2 = 16.78, p =
0.000; for Color-Aware: N = 34 obs., 𝑇 2 = 21.80, p = 0.000; for Shape-Aware: N = 32 obs., 𝑇 2 = 14.94, p = 0.002; for
Order-Aware: N = 38 obs., 𝑇 2 = 22.97, p = 0.000).
36
Furthermore, Hotelling’s T-squared generalized means tests – conducted on the sample of per-subject mean guesses –
show that beliefs in each of the treatments significantly differed from the fully-mixed equilibrium assigning equal
probability to all actions (for Baseline: N = 54 obs., 𝑇 2 = 8.69, p = 0.019; for All-Aware: N = 54 obs., 𝑇 2 = 15.40, p =
0.001; for Color-Aware: N = 34 obs., 𝑇 2 = 8.72, p = 0.023; for Shape-Aware: N = 32 obs., 𝑇 2 = 9.84, p = 0.016; for
Order-Aware: N = 38 obs., 𝑇 2 = 7.94, p = 0.030).
34
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[A]
Choice of the
middle block
-.517
(.134) ***
[.274] *

[B]
Choice of the
bottom block
-.366
(.135) ***
[.259]

Treatment Color-Aware

.339
(.369)
[.293]

-.598
(.350) *
[.284] **

Treatment Shape-Aware

.831
(.352) **
[.287] ***

-.241
(.360)
[.251]

Treatment Order-Aware

.283
(.335)
[.309]

-.749
(.433) *
[.290] **

Top block is a color oddity

-1.738
(.279) ***
[.326] ***

-1.083
(.616) *
[.266] ***

Middle block is a color oddity

1.602
(.194) ***
[.224] ***

-.484
(.344)
[.173] ***

Bottom block is a color oddity

-.346
(.392)
[.104] ***

.053
(.311)
[.135]

Top block is a shape oddity

-1.010
(.215) ***
[.189] ***

-1.222
(.311) ***
[.290] ***

Middle block is a shape oddity

1.269
(.333) ***
[.227] ***

.581
(.460)
[.170] ***

Bottom block is a shape oddity

.563
(.387)
[.111] ***

.352
(.477)
[.112] ***

Constant

-.690
(.228) ***
[.222] ***

-.175
(.355)
[.196]

Treatment All-Aware

0.064
2,120

Pseudo R2
Obs.

Table 3 - Logistic regression coefficients, with robust standard errors adjusted for (triplets’)
[individuals’] clustering. *, **, and *** respectively indicate 𝑝<0.10, 𝑝<0.05, and 𝑝<0.01 for the
relevant Z Statistic, two-tailed tests. The output of the regression has two parts – columns [A] and [B]
– because our “choice by location” outcome variable has three values: top (the comparison group),
middle, and bottom objects. Note: the reference category for each of the treatment dummies is the
Baseline; the reference category for each of the oddity dummies is their negation. The regression uses
the entire choice dataset.
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Note that the output of the regression has two parts (which we respectively report in
columns [A] and [B] of Table 3), since – if one classifies choices by location – the outcome variable
has three values: top (the comparison group), middle, and bottom objects. Also note that below
each coefficient are robust standard errors adjusted for triplets’ and individuals’ clustering,
respectively in round and square brackets. A quick glance at Table 3 shows that the choice of an
object located in the middle or bottom (vs. top) spots is significantly and negatively related to the
presence of a color or shape oddity in the top spot. On the other hand, a middle block is more often
chosen, if the middle block happens to be an oddity. Table 3 further confirms that our treatments –
each to a different extent – significantly affected subjects’ choice distributions. So, the fact that our
treatments have a different impact on each of the binary comparisons (i.e., middle or bottom vs. top)
confirms our previous interpretation of the changes in the overall choice distributions as being
driven by variations in subjects’ awareness of the oddities. (Again, recall that the position of the
oddities did not differ across treatments.) The analysis below will further corroborate such a result.
To that end, we shall focus in turn on the sub-samples of the data containing color or shape
oddities, which collectively account for 9/10 of our observations.37 We begin by examining all the
triplets containing color oddities (triplet-class ‘CO’). Figure 2 below presents frequency
distributions of individual-level choices in such triplets (note that we later analyze a perfectly
symmetric sub-sample that features all the triplets containing shape oddities). Specifically, Figure 2
reports the frequency of play of each and every object in triplet-class ‘CO’, given a classification of
the objects based on their position (see table in the upper panel), as well as a classification of the
same objects based on their color and shape characteristics (see bar graph in the lower panel).
One can see from the bar graph in Figure 2 that there are differences in the frequency with
which All-Aware participants chose (color and shape) oddities relative to Baseline participants, with
All-Aware participants collectively picking oddities slightly less frequently than Baseline

37

By viewing the blocks in Table 1 above it is clear that all but two of the 20 possible three-object selections contain at
least one oddity; that is, all but triplets {1,4,5} and {2,3,6}, implying a “theoretical probability of randomly selecting
either one” equal to 1/10. Moreover, a quick glance at Table 1 reveals that the theoretical probability of randomly
selecting a triplet containing only a color oddity (e.g., {1,2,6}) is 1/3; similarly, the theoretical probability of randomly
selecting a triplet containing only a shape oddity (e.g., {2,3,5}) is 1/3; finally, the theoretical probability of randomly
selecting a triplet containing both color and shape oddities (e.g., {4,5,6}) is 1/3 as well. That being said, we note that
our computerized experiment involved a “constrained” pre-randomization of the blocks in such a way to ensure that
participants in each treatment would be presented with a distribution of triplets representative of the theoretical
distribution; this was also necessary in order to ensure that participants in each treatment would be presented with
exactly the same triplets across rounds.
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participants. Figure 2 further shows that Color-Aware participants have the highest rate of
choosing color oddities, and All-Aware participants have the lowest such rate. By contrast, ShapeAware participants have the highest rate of choosing shape oddities, and Color-Aware participants
have the lowest such rate.
Base

All-A

Color-A

Shape-A Order-A

Top of column is chosen, %

36.73

44.75

37.25

29.17

37.28

Center of column is chosen, %

34.26

28.70

34.80

42.71

35.53

Bottom of column is chosen, %

29.01

26.55

27.95

28.12

27.19

Total, %

100

100

100

100

100

# observations

324

324

204

192

228

Choice (by location)

Figure 2 - The upper panel shows the frequency of play of each object, given a classification of the blocks
based on their position (i.e., top, middle, or bottom), in the sub-sample of the data containing all the color
oddities. The lower panel provides a breakdown of the same data, given a classification of the blocks based
on color/shape oddities. Note that all treatments feature the exact same triplets. For each treatment, the first
(i.e., blue) bar indicates the frequency with which the color oddity was chosen. The second (maroon) and
third (gray) bars respectively indicate the frequency with which the shape oddity and a non-oddity were
chosen in each treatment, with such values being reported solely for the sake of between-treatment
comparisons—note that color oddities and shape oddities are respectively present in 100% and 50% of the
sub-sample (i.e., all the triplets contain a color oddity, with half of such triplets containing a shape oddity as
well). Note that Figure 3 below presents data from a sub-sample that is perfectly symmetric to this one.

A chi-square test conducted on the oddities’ choice data for the entire triplet-class ‘CO’ (as
broken down in the Figure 2 bar graphs) confirms that there is a statistically-significant relationship
between a subject’s choice of oddities and the treatment to which a subject was assigned: N = 1,272
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obs., 𝜒82 = 22.920, p = 0.003, two-tailed. This test provides some suggestive insights into the
relationship between awareness of an attribute and behavior, although it does not measure the effect
ascribable to a specific treatment nor does it control for clustering or for differences between triplets
within the same class.
So, to formally test our hypotheses, we ran a conditional (i.e., triplets’ fixed-effects) logit
model consisting of a subject’s choice of the color oddity as the binary dependent variable and of
treatment dummies as predictors (indicating whether a subject was assigned to that treatment or to
the Baseline). The results – reported in column [I] of Table 4 below – confirm a significant
negative change in the frequency with which color oddities were chosen, when comparing the AllAware treatment with the Baseline: this provides corroborating evidence in support of H1. That is,
an increase in frame awareness reduces All-Aware participants’ reliance on the prior frames (which
in the case of our subjects predominantly consisted of the color frame). So, as a result of
considering extra frames (i.e., a fact that may impact a subject’s rationalizable actions), the rate of
choosing color oddities has fallen in the All-Aware treatment, relative to the Baseline.
Further, note that model [I] of Table 4 shows a positive but non-significant change in the
frequency with which color oddities were chosen, when moving from the Baseline to the ColorAware treatment, a fact that by itself does not warrant rejection of H3 (which states that “Color- and
Shape-Aware participants choose – respectively color and shape – oddities weakly more frequently
than Baseline participants”). Our below analysis of a subject’s choice of shape oddities will in fact
provide evidence in support of H3. Prior to that, we conclude our commentary on model [I] of
Table 4 by noting that there is no significant change between Baseline and Order-Aware treatments,
which provides some first evidence in support of H4 (i.e., “Order-Aware participants choose color
[or shape] oddities with the same frequency as Baseline participants”).
We proceed to examine a different slice of the dataset by presenting an overview of all the
triplets containing shape oddities (triplet-class ‘SO’). Figure 3 shows frequency distributions of
individual-level choices in such triplets. More specifically, Figure 3 reports the frequency of play
of each and every object in triplet-class ‘SO’, given a classification of the objects based on their
position (see the upper panel), as well as a classification of the same objects based on their color
and shape characteristics (see the lower panel).
In particular, the bar graph in Figure 3 confirms changes in the frequency with which AllAware participants chose oddities relative to Baseline participants, with All-Aware participants
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collectively picking oddities slightly less frequently than Baseline participants. Also, Figure 3
indicates that Shape-Aware participants have the highest rate of choosing shape oddities, and
Color-Aware participants have the lowest such rate. We also see that Color-Aware participants
have the highest rate of choosing color oddities, with Shape-Aware participants having the lowest
such rate.
Base

All-A

Color-A

Shape-A Order-A

Top of column is chosen, %

44.14

53.40

47.06

39.06

50.44

Center of column is chosen, %

29.01

21.91

30.88

35.42

28.95

Bottom of column is chosen, %

26.85

24.69

22.06

25.52

20.61

Total, %

100

100

100

100

100

# observations

324

324

204

192

228

Choice (by location)

Figure 3 - The upper panel shows the frequency of play of each object, given a classification of the blocks
based on their position (i.e., top, middle, or bottom), in the sub-sample of the data containing all the shape
oddities. The lower panel provides a breakdown of the same data, given a classification of the blocks based
on color/shape oddities. Note that all treatments feature the exact same triplets. For each treatment, the
second (i.e., maroon) bar indicates the frequency with which the shape oddity was chosen. The first (blue)
and third (gray) bars respectively indicate the frequency with which the color oddity and a non-oddity were
chosen in each treatment, with such values being reported solely for the sake of between-treatment
comparisons—note that shape oddities and color oddities are respectively present in 100% and 50% of the
sub-sample (i.e., all the triplets contain a shape oddity, with half of such triplets containing a color oddity as
well). Note that Figure 2 above presents data from a sub-sample that is perfectly symmetric to this one.

A chi-square test conducted on the oddities’ choice data for the entire triplet-class ‘SO’ (as
broken down in the Figure 3 bar graphs) confirms a statistically-significant relationship between a
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subject’s choice of oddities and the treatment to which a subject was assigned: N = 1,272 obs., 𝜒82 =
16.719, p = 0.033, two-tailed. Yet, since this test does not measure the effect ascribable to each
treatment nor does it control for differences between triplets within the same class, we next turn to
the regression analysis.

[I]
Choice of the
color oddity

[II]
Choice of the
shape oddity

-.265 ***
(.039)

.108
(.167)

Treatment Color-Aware

.090
(.123)

-.529 **
(.222)

Treatment Shape-Aware

.052
(.334)

.428 **
(.203)

Treatment Order-Aware

.023
(.113)

.147
(.188)

Pseudo R2
Obs.

0.003
1,272

0.013
1,272

Treatment All-Aware

Table 4 - Conditional logistic regression coefficients, with robust standard errors adjusted for
(triplets’) clustering.38 *, **, and *** indicate 𝑝<0.10, 𝑝<0.05 and 𝑝<0.01, respectively, for the
relevant Z Statistic, two-tailed tests. Note: the reference category for all the treatment dummies is the
Baseline. Model [I] uses the entire triplet-class ‘CO’, and [II] uses the entire triplet-class ‘SO’.

Specifically, column [II] of Table 4 above presents a conditional (i.e., triplets’ fixed-effects)
logit model consisting of a subject’s choice of the shape oddity as the binary dependent variable and
of treatment dummies as predictors. The model shows a significant negative change in the
frequency with which shape oddities were chosen, when contrasting the Color-Aware treatment
with the Baseline; moreover, the model indicates a significant positive change when comparing
Shape-Aware and Baseline, which provides support for H3 (which states that “Color- and ShapeAware participants choose – respectively color and shape – oddities weakly more frequently than
Baseline participants”). We further note that model [II] shows no significant change between
Order-Aware and Baseline, thereby corroborating the previous evidence in support of H4 (i.e.,
“Order-Aware participants choose color or shape oddities with the same frequency as Baseline
participants”).

Unlike Table 3 above, here we do not report standard errors adjusted for individuals’ clustering, since our triplets’
fixed-effects models do not allow for clustering on individuals.
38
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2. Tests involving one’s beliefs about others’ awareness
Here we test the hypothesis (“H2”) that there is a relationship between one’s behavior and
one’s beliefs about the others’ awareness, as implied by our notion of frame-dependent
rationalizability. We do so by presenting a few logistic regressions on the All-Aware dataset.

[I]
Choice of the
color oddity

[II]
Choice of the
shape oddity

[III]
Choice of the
top object

Belief about others noticing different colors
𝜇𝑖C

.026 *
(.015)

-.045 ***
(.012)

-.003
(.023)

Belief about others noticing different shapes
𝜇𝑖S

-.009
(.007)

.062 ***
(.015)

-.014
(.018)

-.015 **
(.007)

.007
(.006)

.031 **
(.013)

Constant

-.332
(.814)

-2.545 **
(1.062)

-.945
(1.205)

Pseudo R2
Obs.

0.030
246

0.036
187

0.019
177

Belief about others noticing order
𝜇𝑖O

Table 5 - Logistic regression coefficients, with robust standard errors adjusted for (triplets’) clustering.
*, **, and *** indicate 𝑝<0.10, 𝑝<0.05 and 𝑝<0.01, respectively, for the relevant Z Statistic, twotailed tests. Note: [I] uses triplet-class ‘CO’ in All-Aware; [II] uses triplet-class ‘SO’ in All-Aware;
[III] uses all the triplets in All-Aware.

We first examine whether a subject’s choice of the color oddity is frame-dependent
rationalizable, given the subject’s beliefs. To that end, we ran a logit model consisting of a
subject’s choice of the color oddity as the binary dependent variable and of belief variables as
predictors. That is, we used continuous variables measuring the All-Aware participants’ beliefs
about others noticing the different colors, shapes, and order of the blocks, respectively denoted 𝜇𝑖C ,
𝜇𝑖S , and 𝜇𝑖O for ease of reference. More precisely, to test for (frame-dependent) rationalizability of a

color oddity, we must restrict attention to the sub-sample of participants whose beliefs are such that
𝜇𝑖C ≥ 𝜇𝑖S and 𝜇𝑖C ≥ 𝜇𝑖O . Results from model [I] of Table 5 reveal a positive and mildly significant

effect of the belief about others noticing the different colors (𝜇𝑖C ) on a subject’s choice of the color
oddity. The model also indicates no significant effect of 𝜇𝑖S , and a significant negative effect of 𝜇𝑖O .
In plain words, this means that All-Aware participants are more likely to pick a color oddity, the
more they believe that others are likely to consider a color frame rather than an order frame. This
provides some evidence in support of (the color-relevant part of) H2.a, which states that “the
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frequency with which All-Aware participants choose color oddities is positively related to their
belief about others noticing the different colors”.
Next, we examine if a subject’s choice of the shape oddity is frame-dependent
rationalizable. To do so, we ran a logit model consisting of a subject’s choice of the shape oddity as
the binary dependent variable and of the above belief variables as predictors. In this case, to test for
(frame-dependent) rationalizability of a shape oddity, we must restrict attention to the sub-sample of
participants whose beliefs are such that 𝜇𝑖S ≥ 𝜇𝑖C and 𝜇𝑖S ≥ 𝜇𝑖O . Model [II] of Table 5 reveals a
significant positive effect of the belief about others noticing the different shapes (𝜇𝑖S ) on a subject’s
choice of the shape oddity. The model also indicates no significant effect of 𝜇𝑖O , and a significant
negative effect of 𝜇𝑖C . This means that All-Aware participants are more likely to pick a shape oddity,
the more they believe that others are likely to consider a shape frame rather than a color frame.
This provides evidence in support of (the shape-relevant part of) H2.a, which states that “the
frequency with which All-Aware participants choose shape oddities is positively related to their
belief about others noticing the different shapes”.
We finally verify if a subject’s choice of the top block is frame-dependent rationalizable.
So, we consider a logit model consisting of a subject’s choice of the top object as the binary
dependent variable and of the above belief variables as predictors. To test for (frame-dependent)
rationalizability of the top block, we must restrict attention to the sub-sample of participants whose
beliefs are such that 𝜇𝑖O ≥ 𝜇𝑖C and 𝜇𝑖O ≥ 𝜇𝑖S . Results from model [III] of Table 5 reveal a significant
positive effect of the belief about others noticing the order of the blocks (𝜇𝑖O ) on a subject’s choice
of the top object. The model also indicates no significant effects of 𝜇𝑖C or 𝜇𝑖S . This provides
evidence in support of H2.b., which states that “if one believes that others are more likely to notice
the objects’ order (rather than colors or shapes), then one is more likely to choose the top block”.
To conclude, the data provide strong evidence in support of both components of H2,
validating our notion of rationalizability: the results seem to indicate that subjects did attempt to
maximize a frame-dependent expected utility. Given this, the curious reader might wonder how
variations in individuals’ awareness ultimately affect coordination. To address this point, we report
below the coordination rates resulting from the observed distribution of individual choices;
specifically, in keeping with previous studies of coordination, we report expected coordination rates
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(as opposed to actual frequencies of coordination; see for example Mehta et al., 1994, and Crawford
et al., 2008),39 computed at the session level.40
As a reference group, we shall consider the case in which an All-Aware participant is
assigned to a Baseline participant – as per our experimental design – which yields a 44.6%
coordination rate (averaging across all sessions). We then turn to the hypothetical case in which a
Baseline participant is assigned to another Baseline participant, yielding a 50.2% coordination rate
(averaging across all sessions). Contrasting the full distribution of per-session mean rates of <AllAware, Baseline> pairs with that of the <Baseline, Baseline> pairs, we conclude that such rates
significantly differ from each other: N = 12 obs., z = -2.201, p = 0.027, two-tailed Wilcoxon signed
rank sum test. Additionally, one can use a binomial test to verify whether (same-direction)
differences between the coordination rates are due to chance, as opposed to treatment-induced
variations in awareness. To that end, we note that <All-Aware, Baseline> pairs exhibit lower
coordination rates than hypothetical <Baseline, Baseline> pairs in six out of six sessions, thereby
confirming that variations in individuals’ awareness have an impact on coordination rates (N = 6, p
= 0.031, two-tailed). In brief, these tests say that (perhaps counter to common intuition) awareness
of additional solutions can hurt participants in coordination problems.41
We further note that our supplemental treatments enhance coordination relative to the main
treatments (i.e., <All-Aware, Baseline> pairs): that is, <Color-Aware, Color-Aware> pairs exhibit a
47.9% coordination rate; moreover, <Shape-Aware, Shape-Aware> pairs have a 50.4% coordination
rate, and <Order-Aware, Order-Aware> pairs have a 50.3% coordination rate. Since each of the
supplemental treatments comprised only two sessions, for the purpose of hypothesis-testing we shall
contrast the distribution of per-session mean rates of the <All-Aware, Baseline> pairs with that of
the supplemental treatments as a whole. Despite the small sample size, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test shows mild evidence of a significant increase in coordination rates when moving from our main
treatments to the supplemental treatments: N = 12 obs., Z = -1.922, p = 0.054, two-tailed. Finally,

39

Note that coordination rates depend on individual choices and on a purely random element, that is, the random
assignment of partners: it is clear that – given a relatively small sample size – such a random element is likely to bias
coordination rates. “Thus, the actual frequency of coordination has no special significance; it is more appropriate to
consider the expected frequency of coordination”, Mehta et al. (1994, p. 663), italics in original.
40
Such rates are obtained by calculating the probability that two participants pick the same object in a certain round
(i.e., triplet) and session, given the observed distribution of individual choices; per-session mean rates are then
obtained by averaging across all the rounds in a given session.
41
It is clear from our analysis of individual behavior that such a negative impact does not mean that All-Aware
participants behaved more randomly; instead, it indicates that participants best-responded to incorrect beliefs.
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note that all the coordination rates are higher than chance even in the absence of exogenous labels,
as in the case of the All-Aware and Baseline treatments. So, subjects exploited natural frames.42

VI. Concluding remarks
Our model suggests that different players are aware of different attributes of the strategy
options, and hence use different frames. Given this, our model provides a rationalization of why
differences in players’ frames may lead to differences in choice behavior. Our data find support for
our notion of frame-depend rationalizability. In particular, participants’ choices vary across the
Baseline and the All-Aware treatments, as a result of considering new frames. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to present a coherent – theoretical and experimental – account of the
effect of manipulating awareness (of alternative framings) on strategic behavior. In this regard, we
note that previous lab experiments have made the case for heterogeneity in subjects’ natural frames.
For example, Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) confirmed the existence of individual differences in
attribute perception and behavior. However, neither their design nor others have manipulated
subjects’ awareness of alternative framings, thereby investigating if subjects can learn new frames
(and thus rationally maximize an updated frame-dependent expected utility).
In this connection, we note that Bacharach and Stahl (2000) propose a boundedly rational
version of a framing model that builds on level-k theory (Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995;
Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007; Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri,
2013). Bacharach and Stahl introduce some strong assumptions about both the structure of labels –
which implicitly vary with players’ perceptual limitations – and the players’ depth of reasoning
about others’ limitations. Specifically, Bacharach and Stahl assume that non-strategic level-0 types
disregard any other players’ behavior, and pick each of their labeled strategies with equal
probability. (E.g., suppose that the set of possible labels is {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧}; given this, the authors posit that
level-0 types play 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 with equal probability, regardless of how many objects are assigned each of
those labels; Bacharach and Stahl, 2000, pp. 230-231.) Higher types then best-respond to the
strategies of lower-level players, as is typical of level-k models. Here, if one were to use the
Bacharach-Stahl model to formulate hypotheses in the context of our treatments, some ad hoc
assumptions (about the labels associated with level-0 players) would be needed. Whereas the
42

In fact, one should view the above coordination rates in light of the improvement over 1/3 (i.e., the expected rate of
random coordination), so that for example the comparison between 44.6% and 47.9% effectively reflects an
improvement of 11.3 percentage points versus one of 14.6 percentage points.
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Bacharach-Stahl theory remains indeterminate insofar as our All-Aware manipulation is concerned,
we note that their model is easily applied to treatments in which labels are exogenously assigned. In
particular, a direct implication of their model is that if each object is assigned a distinct label (e.g.,
“first”, “second”, “third”), then choices should not significantly differ from a discrete uniform
distribution. This prediction is clearly falsified by the data from our Order-Aware treatment (see
the right-most column in the upper panel of Table 2, p. 23).
It is worth noting that a different line of research on framing has compared behavior
between games with identical payoff structures but distinct game labels (e.g., the “Community
game” versus the “Wall Street game”; Kay and Ross, 2003; Liberman, Samuels, and Ross, 2004;
Ellingsen, Johannesson, Mollerstrom, and Munkhammar, 2012). Experiments have also considered
games with identical payoff structures but different strategy labels (e.g., {“cooperate”, “defect”}
versus {“out”, “in”}; Andreoni, 1995; Larrick and Blount, 1997).43 What those studies have in
common is the fact that the experimenter induces a distinct “normative frame” by evoking
individualistic versus cooperative norms. There, the experimenter affects players’ beliefs by
directing their attention toward the actions one ought (or ought not) to take in the context that is
evoked by the labels employed: as such, the theoretical explanation of a normative frame rests on
the players’ guilt aversion (Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-Schmidt, 2011). In this respect, we
depart from the studies above because – unlike the case of normative frames – we focus on pure
coordination games, thereby ruling out confounds due to social preferences. Relatedly, we argue
that a guilt-aversion explanation of the impact of manipulating frames is inadequate for our case.
That said, our framework may have useful application to (“impure” coordination) problems
incorporating an element of conflict as well.44 Understanding the perception-action link has
implications for virtually any class of strategic problems: indeed, successful coordination or anticoordination depends on the fact that players share some action representations. While game theory
traditionally assumes that this is always the case (in that players’ strategy labels are exogenously
given), everyday life teaches us that the strategies available to an individual are not always clear
cut; in fact, individuals who first face a problem may be unaware of some action representations.
43

Another line of research studies how labels can influence bargaining games with communication (Isoni, Poulsen,
Sugden, and Tsutsui, 2014). For early experiments on the impact of labels in zero-sum games see O’Neill (1987),
Rapoport and Boebel (1992), and Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller (1997). See also Crawford and Iriberri (2007).
44
Among the possible applications, we note that a design implementing alternative games may allow testing for lower
order frame-dependent rationality. In fact, an advantage of our solution concept is that – since it is defined inductively –
it also generates predictions for every finite level-k mutual belief in (frame-dependent) rationality, without anchoring
beliefs on arbitrary level-0 players as per the previous literature.
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APPENDIX (for online publication)
Experimental Instructions and Screen Shots

Baseline and All-Aware treatments
NOTE. The screen shots below refer to both treatments, unless otherwise noted.

→Screen shot 1:
Consent form.
→Screen shot 2:
Hello and welcome to a decision making experiment. You will receive a show up fee, and can also earn
additional money. The additional payment will be determined by your own choices and those made by
some other participant, according to the rules described below.
→Screen shot 3:

i

→Screen shot 4:

→Screen shot 5:

NOTE. Here three objects just slid toward the right; i.e., in the screen shot above the program has selected
three blocks – one by one – and put them in a column, on the right-hand side of the screen.
ii

→Screen shot 6:

NOTE. The (three) available strategy options are now shown on their own.

→Screen shot 7:

NOTE. The subject is prompted to enter one label per object.
iii

→Screen shot 8.i (All-Aware ONLY):

→Screen shot 8.ii:

NOTE. The spokes are initially arranged in such a way that each sector corresponds to one-third of the
area. Within each sector there is a text box containing the label the subject entered in Screen shot 7.
iv

→Screen shot 9:

NOTE. The labels next to each of the options are those entered by the subject in Screen shot 7.

→Screen shot 10 (Instructions):
In what follows you will go through 9 other rounds, where each round will involve the same type of tasks
as the ones you have performed so far.
NOTE. Screen shots 4 to 9 are repeated.

v

Color-Aware treatment
This treatment is the same as the Baseline, with the exception of Screen shots 7-9, where exogenous – color –
labels are shown. See example below.

Shape-Aware treatment
This treatment is the same as the Baseline, with the exception of Screen shots 7-9, where exogenous – shape –
labels are shown. See example below.

vi

Order-Aware treatment
This treatment is the same as the Baseline, with the exception of Screen shots 7-9, where exogenous – order –
labels are shown. See example below.
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